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“China is a sleeping dragon that is just beginning to stir.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a shift in world power that can be felt by world leaders and
ordinary citizens alike, and its movement will realign the rest of the world. 
Since its rise to a great world power after World War II, the United States
has maintained its position as the world’s predominant leader, both 
militarily and economically. However, this dominance is threatened by a
formidable challenger. A rapidly ascending China is challenging the United 
States’ military and economic power, but the United States is not adequately
positioned to meet this challenge. Some scholars theorize that China and
the United States are poised on a collision course for war unless both
countries undertake difficult affirmative actions to construct an ongoing
peaceful relationship.2 
This Comment provides an overview of the current and potential challenges 
presented by China’s rise in power as well as the recent responses by the
United States. Second, it will provide the historical context of the United
States’ presence in the South China Sea by examining the military and 
economic benefits that the United States has achieved since World War 
II. Third, this Comment explores recent events in the South China Sea that
enable a better understanding of both China’s intentions and the political 
and economic pressures applied by China to its regional neighbors. Finally, 
this Comment analyzes the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) which 
was signed into law by President Trump to address the rising geopolitical 
issues in the South China Sea. 
1. The Office: China (NBC television broadcast Dec. 2, 2010). 
2. GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR vii (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. 
Company, 2017). 
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ARIA will be discussed at further length below, however a brief 
introduction is appropriate to understand the United States’ current foreign 
policy approach in Asia. ARIA provides a broad statement of United 
States policy in the Indo-Pacific,3 which seeks to reassure its partners and 
strategic allies of the United States’ continued commitment to the region.4 
However, ARIA is not written as a doctrine for affirmative actions to 
construct a peaceful relationship with China. Instead, it provides a temporary 
placeholder in the attempt to maintain the status quo in the hopes of
containing China.5 This Comment argues that the United States must reassess
ARIA’s limits to implement a revised policy that addresses the growing 
strength and influence of China on traditional United States economic 
partners and military allies. The United States should implement a policy 
that promotes continued strong economic and military strategies that can 
survive the periodic turnovers of presidential administrations. By promoting 
consistency in these policies and military support, the United States is more 
likely to instill confidence in its allies and partners in Asia who are otherwise 
subject to greater pressure to acquiesce to China’s ongoing campaign. 
This Comment is neither written to object to the rise of China, nor to 
serve as a call to action by the United States to reestablish itself as the 
predominant leader in Asia. Rather, the Comment is intended as a wake-
up call for the United States. China has increased its tendency to undermine
the pillars of peace and stability in Asia that have enabled the growth and 
3. The terms “Indo Pacific” and “Asia Pacific,” which are both used throughout 
this Comment, may appear to be interchangeable based on context. However, there are 
important differences. The term “Indo-Pacific” refers to the region running from Eastern 
Africa to the Pacific Ocean, whereas the term “Asia-Pacific” traditionally referred to 
the Asian continent and Pacific Ocean. However, the United States has recently been using 
the “Indo-Pacific” term to replace the “Asia-Pacific” term. Some scholars theorize that 
this is a change in the foreign policy posture of the U.S. to shift the focal point of the region 
away from Asia, which is largely dominated by China. See Angaindrankumar Gnanasagaran, 
Between “Indo-Pacific” and “Asia-Pacific”, THE ASEAN POST (Nov. 18, 2017), https:// 
theaseanpost.com/article/between-indo-pacific-and-asia-pacific [https://perma.cc/Q7G5-
JQTQ]; Tashny Sukumaran, What’s the Difference Between Indo Pacific and Asia-Pacific? 
Regional Control for the US or China, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/3015892/whats-difference-between-
indo-pacific-and-asia-pacific-regional [https://perma.cc/28KU-HKY5].
4. ARIA states that “[w]ithout strong leadership from the United States, the
international system . . . may wither” therefore it is “imperative that the United States continue 
to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific. See MICHAEL F. MARTIN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., IF11148, THE ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT (ARIA) OF 2018 (2019). 
5. Id.
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success of China and its neighbors.6 However, the United States’ recent 
responses are emblematic of an American acceptance or acquiescence to 
China’s disruptions.7 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS & ISSUES
A. Introduction
Currently, the United States and China are in a precarious position. To 
manage China’s growth and prepare itself for the rise of China as a world 
power, the United States needs to take aggressive steps. These steps 
include policies that can shape China’s choices in positive directions and 
channel its rise and nationalistic ambitions towards norms of cooperation 
rather than coercion.8 In addition, the United States should seek to reinforce 
and reestablish relationships with important allies and trading partners in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
B. Recent Economic Events
1. United States’ Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Recent actions by the United States, including its withdrawal from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), have bolstered China’s expansion of 
power and influence in the Asia-Pacific.9 After the United States withdrew 
from the TPP, China moved in to fill the void with its economic development 
strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Made in China 
2025 strategy.10 
6. Ash Carter, Reflections on American Grand Strategy in Asia, BELFER CTR. FOR 
SCIENCE & INT’L AFF., HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Oct. 2018), https://www.belfercenter.org/
publication/reflections-american-grand-strategy-asia [https://perma.cc/9H8Q-L76N].
7. See, e.g., the United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
which provided space for China to expand its economic influence in Asia. By avoiding the 
TPP, the United States missed an opportunity to strengthen its relationships in Asia by 
providing assistance to existing trade allies in the region to counter China’s economic 
leverage. See id. 
8. Douglas H. Paal, America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 31, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/31/america-s-
future-in-dynamic-asia-pub-78222 [https://perma.cc/B8TP-QHWH]. 
9. Why Trump’s Withdrawal from the TPP is a Boon for China, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Jan. 24, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-
states-canada/article/2064927/why-trumps-withdrawal-tpp-boon-china [https://perma.cc/
CJ2P-XXGH]. 
10. The United States and some countries in Asia view the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) as a possible Trojan horse for Chinese regional development and military expansion. 
See Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, COUNCIL 
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In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the BRI 
as a means to establish a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, 
highways, and streamlined border crossings to be spread throughout the 
Asian continent and the rest of Southeast Asia.11 These plans also include
expanding maritime traffic and increasing Chinese investment in port
development.12 Analysts view the launch of the BRI as China’s retaliation 
against the United States for refocusing on Asia.13 Analysts identify the
initiative as a means for China to develop new investment opportunities, 
cultivate new markets, and increase domestic consumption.14 
The Trump Administration has stressed that there are significant risks 
posed to countries benefitting from China’s assistance, and they may incur 
debts that they cannot pay.15 These debts will make them vulnerable 
to Chinese political pressure,  resulting in otherwise unfavorable practices 
like hosting military bases.16 Although the Trump Administration is aware 
of the dangers posed by China’s ability to apply pressure to its neighbors, 
the Trump Administration’s actions continue to perpetuate these dangers.17 
2. The United States & China Sign “Phase One”  
of the Trade Agreement 
On January 15, 2020, the United States and China signed “Phase One”
of the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China (Trade Agreement).18 The signing of the Trade Agreement is meant 
ON FOREIGN REL. (May 21, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-
and-road-initiative [https://perma.cc/3HNX-D9TW].
11. Chatzky & McBride, supra note 10. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.
 14. Id. 
15. Michael Schuman, The U.S. Can’t Make Allies Take Sides Over China, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/us-
allies-washington-china-belt-road/587902/ [https://perma.cc/5MKJ-NJNG].
16. Paal, supra note 8. 
17. These dangers include China’s enhanced military capabilities which have undertaken 
significant modernization efforts since at least 2015 to transform China’s military structure, 
including a modern 300 ship navy with modern capable equipment and weaponry. Recent 
military developments with China are discussed further below. See id. 
 18. See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and 
the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement 
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to pause the escalating trade tensions between the world’s two largest 
economies.19 For the time being, the Trade Agreement has paused the 
escalating trade war with China.20 Despite the Trade Agreement’s cooling 
off effect on the trade tensions with China, there are concerns about the 
viability of the deal if one party implements the Trade Agreement’s dispute 
resolution clause.21 This clause states that if either side fails to uphold its
end of the Trade Agreement, then the dispute resolution clause can be used 
to allow the other party to retaliate, which includes the possible imposition 
of further trade tariffs.22 
3. The Economic Effect of the Coronavirus
The Trade Agreement was not designed to withstand rapid shifts in 
global trade. The recent spread of the Coronavirus Disease threatens
to overturn the world economy and may drastically impact economic stability 
between the United States and China.23 The effects of the virus could have 
the effect of shutting down the economies of Japan, South Korea, Europe, 
and even the United States.24 Although this Comment focuses on the long-
term effects and consequences of United States trade in Asia, the spread
of coronavirus is particularly concerning for both China and the United 
States in the short term and long term. Coronavirus’s presence in China 
resulted in significant closures of Chinese factories and led to a massive 
shock to the Chinese economy.25 The spread of the disease also caused 
_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU7L-249K] [hereinafter 
Trade Agreement]. 
19. Among the agreements of the “Phase One” deal, China is now required to
purchase $200 billion worth of goods above what it had purchased in 2017, for years 2020 
and 2021. See id. art. 6.2. 
 20. James Politi, US and China Sign Deal to Pause Trade War, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/54d703e4-37b4-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 [https://perma.cc/
4S7Y-BZB4].
21.  Trade Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 7.3. 
22. Id.; Chad P. Bown, Unappreciated Hazards of the US-China Phase One Deal, 
PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Jan. 21, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-
and-investment-policy-watch/unappreciated-hazards-us-china-phase-one-deal [https://perma. 
cc/3FUH-ZZRP].
23. Bown, supra note 22. 
24. Alexandra Stevenson, China Stopped Its Economy to Tackle Coronavirus. Now 
the World Suffers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/
business/economy/china-coronavirus-economy.html [https://perma.cc/78HC-TH72].
25. Martha C. White, Coronavirus Has Potential to Shake Up China Trade More 
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economists and trade analysts to doubt China’s capability to buy the
required $200 billion in additional American exports.26 
C. Recent Events Affecting U.S. Military and Strategic Relationships
As mentioned above and later in this Comment, the TPP would have had 
a remarkable effect on companies based in the United States and partners 
in Asia. When the Trump Administration abandoned the TPP, it failed to 
recognize the significance of the TPP’s effect on military and security 
aspects. By adhering to the TPP and strengthening its relationships with 
regional partners, the United States would be able to bolster its trading 
network outside of China and, in turn, bolster its national security against 
a rising China.27 Former Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter,28 often said that
the TPP was as important, militarily and strategically, as an aircraft carrier.29 
In addition to China’s economic development strategies, the United
States must also address ongoing military confrontations with China. The
current maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas raise
concerns about possible conflicts between China, the United States, and 
neighboring countries, such as Japan or the Philippines.30 These conflicts
could force the United States to become involved given its bilateral security 
treaties with Japan and the Philippines.31 
One of the most prominent frameworks used by analysts to understand 
U.S.-China relations is the Thucydides Trap,32 which was coined by Professor 
Graham Allison.33 The Thucydides Trap refers to the “almost inevitable 
 26. Catherine Boudreau, Coronavirus May Undercut China’s Phase-One Farm 
Purchases, POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/ 
morning-agriculture/2020/03/10/coronavirus-may-undercut-chinas-phase-one-farm-
purchases-785967 [https://perma.cc/698G-9CWZ]. 
27. Carter, supra note 6.
28. In addition to his service as the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2015-2017, Ash 
Carter is also regarded as an expert in foreign relations in Asia and designed and executed 
the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific. See Ash Carter, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L 
AFF., HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.belfercenter.org/person/ash-carter [https://perma.cc/
K852-L5DQ].
29. Carter, supra note 6.
 30. RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42784, U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC 
COMPETITION IN SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
(Aug. 28, 2020).
31. Id.
 32. Paal, supra note 8. 
33. Graham Allison is a professor of government at Harvard University and is a leading 
analyst of national security with special interests in China and decision-making. For a more 
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tendency for relations between an established declining power and a rising 
one to devolve into direct competition and conflict.”34 According to Professor 
Allison, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides wrote about a war that 
devasted Sparta and Athens, the two leading city-states in classical Greece.35 
Further, Thucydides theorized that “[i]t was the rise of Athens and the fear 
that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”36 It is important to
note however, that both Dr. Allison and Thucydides meant ‘inevitable’ as 
a hyperbole.37 The potential for armed conflict between China and the 
United States is significantly more likely if they continue on their current 
paths.38 Each side must recognize the threats and underlying stresses 
between the two nations to construct a peaceful relationship.39 
Although the relationship shared between the United States and China
is arguably much more complicated than the conflict between Sparta and 
Athens, the analytical framework is still useful in understanding the 
inevitable unease accompanying the shift in power from the United States 
to China.40 The impact of China’s rise to power will be felt most directly
by the current world leader, the United States.41 Professor Allison states that, 
as China gets bigger, stronger, more prosperous, and technologically more 
advanced, it will inevitably aggravate American positions and prerogatives.42 
Thus, the United States must recognize this dilemma and take affirmative 
action to balance the shifting of power and prevent military conflict. 
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
An analysis of the current developments surrounding the United States 
in the South China Sea requires starting from the conclusion of World 
War II. Japan’s surrender to the United States on August 14, 1945, ushered 
in a historic shift of global power measured by the increase in active U.S. 
naval ships across the globe.43 This shift created a lasting United States 
detailed background on Professor Allison, see Graham Allison, HARVARD, https://www.hks.
harvard.edu/faculty/graham-allison [https://perma.cc/5RNS-7TPU]. 
34. Paal, supra note 8. 
35. ALLISON, supra note 2, at vii. 
36. Id.
 37. Id. at viii.
 38. Id. at vii. 
39. Id. at ix. 
40. Paal, supra note 8. 
41. TED, Is War Between China and the US Inevitable: Graham Allison, YOUTUBE (Nov.
20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XewnyUJgyA4 [https://perma.cc/8ZSL-WZQ8]. 
42. Id.
43. Prior to the beginning of World War II in 1939, the United States only had 
approximately 394 active U.S. Navy ships. However, by Japan’s surrender in 1945, the 
122
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military presence in Asia that shaped the explosive growth of the United 
States that has continued to this day.44 The United States “enjoyed an 
unchallenged ascendancy, or what some call [an American] primacy in 
these domains.”45 This primacy was established by a dominant U.S. Navy 
presence in the territories formerly occupied by Japan in the South Pacific 
and by forming strong ties with South Korea and the Philippines.46 At that 
time, the United States had the most powerful navy in the world.47 
Subsequent conflicts in Southeast Asia were also instrumental in 
establishing U.S. influence and military presence in the region.48 Even 
though the United States ultimately emerged unsuccessful following the
Vietnam War, it nonetheless acquired an advantageous strategic position 
in Southeast Asia by forming alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, 
and establishing “friendly ties with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.”49 
Following the end of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and then the 
withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States has relied on its alliances and 
arrangements with friendly powers to support its maritime and air presence 
in Southeast Asia.50 By the mid-1990s, United States forces patrolled the
region, including the South China Sea, unchallenged and benefitted from 
agreed access to ports51 throughout much of the area.52 
United States Navy had approximately 6,768 active ships across the globe. See US Ship 
Force Levels, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:03 AM), https:// 
www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#1938 
[https://perma.cc/6EVD-7S6Q].
44. See Tom O’Connor, V-J Day: U.S. Military Power in Asia Grew After World
War II, But Do We Still Need Bases There?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-power-asia-grew-world-war-two-do-we-need-
bases-there-1070931 [https://perma.cc/7JVA-F4L6].
45. See Paal, supra note 8.
 46. See Marvin Ott, The South China Sea in Strategic Terms, WILSON CTR. (May 
14, 2019), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-south-china-sea-strategic-terms 
[https://perma.cc/L3XG-DVDK].
47. See Kyle Mizokami, 5 Most Powerful Navies of All Time, THE NAT’L INT. (July
12, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-most-powerful-navies-all-time-13311 [https://
perma.cc/SCW5-7RJX]. 
48. See Ott, supra note 46. 
49. See id.
 50. See Paal, supra note 8.
 51. See Ott, supra note 46. 
52. The U.S. force in this region includes roughly 28,500 American troops stationed
in South Korea, 5,000 troops stationed on Guam, and 50,000 troops stationed in Japan, 
including more than 20,000 troops who are stationed permanently at airbases within the 
country. Agence France-Presse, The US has a Massive Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific. 
Here’s What You Need to Know About It, THE WORLD (Aug. 11, 2017, 4:00 PM), https:// 
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The United States understood the strategic importance of assisting these 
countries and used their access as a launching point to advance American
interests. The alliance created between the United States and Japan after 
WWII reconciled the two enemy nations and laid the groundwork for the 
reconstruction of Japan, which rose to become the world’s second-largest 
economy.53 While the alliance was just between the two countries, it had 
a significant impact on Asia as a whole and is regarded by many countries 
as an essential piece of the region’s security structure.54 Partnering with
these Asian countries and providing them with assistance helped to advance 
America’s core national security interests by promoting economic development 
and regional stability, while also opening and expanding international markets 
for U.S. businesses.55 
Furthermore, the partnerships have helped to empower these Asian 
countries to become self-reliant and have also assisted in their transformation 
from war-torn nations into thriving economies.56 The result of increased 
United States presence led to remarkably fewer serious threats to peace in 
the region.57 Japan, for example, was able to redistribute its resources from 
security to economic development, which resulted in a massive boom in 
economic expansion and a notable increase in living standards.58 This
economic success was mirrored in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, 
and China, which replicated Japan’s success with foreign aid and investment 
opportunities, leading to even faster rates of economic growth and higher 
living standards.59 Essentially, the ties created between the United States 
and these Asian countries have produced an inclusive network that encourages 
regional and international integration.60 
The deep integration of the United States’ economic influence and 
military support throughout the South China Sea and the surrounding region 
facilitated the growth of the United States as a world power.61 In addition 
to its massive growth, the United States’ development into a world power 
www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-11/us-has-massive-military-presence-asia-pacific-heres-what-
you-need-know-about-it [https://perma.cc/JCP2-RXT8].
53. William Breer, U.S. Alliances in East Asia: Internal Challenges and External 
Threats, BROOKINGS (May 12, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/u-s-alliances-
in-east-asia-internal-challenges-and-external-threats/ [https://perma.cc/9ZVB-EHA6].
54. Id. 
55. Patrick Christy, America’s Proud History of Post-War Aid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (June 6, 2014, 5:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/
06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii [https://perma.cc/QE34-3X69].
56. Id. 
57. Breer, supra note 53. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Christy, supra note 55; see also Carter, supra note 6. 
61. See Ott, supra note 46. 
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also ushered many of its regional allies and partners into economic prosperity.62 
The security provided by the increased United States military presence 
paired with the development of institutions, such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),63 nurtured economic growth and regional
modernization.64 
Although the United States has no territorial claim in the South China 
Sea and does not claim sovereignty over any of the geographic features in
the Sea, the United States is still heavily invested in preventing the rise of 
a regional hegemon in that part of the world.65 Following the end of WWII,
the United States maintained its position as the most influential country in 
the South China Sea and surrounding regions; however, the United States 
is now facing a strong challenger in China.66 China’s recent actions are raising 
concerns that it may be making affirmative efforts to dominate the South 
China Sea, with the ultimate goal of making China a regional hegemon that 
will assert influence or control over current United States trade partners 
and strategic military allies.67 
IV. HOW THE UNITED STATES BENEFITS FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. Current Economic Value
The famous English adventurer Sir Walter Raleigh once said, “[f]or 
whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands 
the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently 
the world itself.”68 Raleigh’s words are mirrored in the recent struggle for
command over the South China Sea and the surrounding region. Economic 
and militaristic control over the South China Sea are both pivotal in balancing 
62. Id.
63. ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization aimed at promoting economic 
growth and regional stability among its members, which include Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Johnny 
Wood, What is ASEAN?, WORLD ECON. F. (May 9, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2017/05/what-is-asean-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/K4JA-B3W3]. 
64. See Ott, supra note 46. 
65. BEN DOLVEN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., IFI0607, SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. POLICY (Feb. 23, 2017). 
66. Id.
 67. Id.
 68. See Genevieve Wanucha, “For Whosoever Commands the Sea Commands the 
Trade,” MIT MECHE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://meche.mit.edu/news-media/”-whosoever-
commands-sea-commands-trade [https://perma.cc/TH2P-PUB4].
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the power struggle in the Indo-Pacific between the United States, China, 
and other regional powers.69 
The sea-lanes of the South China Sea are some of the most valuable, 
busiest, and important waterways in the world.70 Analysts estimate that 
over 3.4 trillion dollars’ worth of goods passed through these lanes in 2016, 
which amounted to an astounding one-third of all global shipping that  
year.71 Additionally, over 64% of China’s maritime trade passed through
the South China Sea in 2016, which is a noteworthy amount considering 
China’s looming presence as a world-leading economy.72 China is estimated
to have a 14.8% share of the world gross domestic product, which is worth 
an estimated trade value of $1.47 trillion.73 In addition to the South China
Sea’s significance with global trade as a whole, approximately two-thirds 
of the world’s oil shipments pass through these lanes from the Indian Ocean 
to the Pacific Ocean, with much of it heading to a growing and energy-
dependent China.74 Although the United States relies less on the South
China Sea than China, “with just over 14% of its maritime trade passing 
through the region,”75 control over the South China Sea carries significant 
economic implications that demand attention from the United States.76 
69. See Michael D. Swaine et al., Creating a Stable Asia: An Agenda for a U.S.-China 
Balance of Power, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 13 (2016), https://carnegie 
endowment.org/files/CEIP_Swaine_U.S.-Asia_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW3K-B5PL].
70. Ott, supra note 46. 
71. Id.




74. Roncevert Ganan Almond, Trade, War, and the South China Sea, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Sept. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/trade-war-and-the-south-china-sea/ [https:// 
perma.cc/FFM7-N3AY].
75. See Trade Transits, supra note 72. 
76. For an interesting overview of the exact values of trade between China, the
United States, and other countries across the world, see Top Trading Partners – December 
2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/
top1912yr.html [https://perma.cc/7GFK-3NZN]. See also Raul Amoros, The World’s $86 
Trillion Economy Visualized in One Chart, HOWMUCH.NET (Aug. 15, 2019), https://how 
much.net/articles/the-world-economy-2018 [https://perma.cc/4RW6-EBCU]. 
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TRADE TRANSITS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA77 
With its current foreign trade approaches, the United States is losing its 
economic partners and strategic allies in Asia, creating a vacuum that
China is preparing to occupy.78 The United States is losing partners in
Asia due to their unpredictable responses in the region and their failures 
to act when needed.79 Affirmative actions like the withdrawal from TPP
and President Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders like Kim Jon-un 
and Xi Jinping fail to send strong signals to established allies of the United
States’ support and reliability.80 The withdrawal from the TPP damaged
the United States’ credibility with regional partners as a proponent of free 
trade and further jeopardized the possibility of future trade agreements.81 
Additionally, the United States further damaged its reliability “by reopening
[the North American Free Trade Agreement] negotiations and threatening
South Korea with renegotiating the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.”82 
Finally, by taking a sideline approach to many of the rising issues in the 
region, the United States further bolstered this lack of confidence. President 
77. The second most active Asian country in the South China Sea, Japan, only has 
a trade value of USD $240 billion through the South China Sea amounting to 19.1% of all 
trade in goods in the South China Sea. See Trade Transits, supra note 72. 
78. Why Trump’s Withdrawal from the TPP is a Boon for China, supra note 9; Edward
Wong, Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles with an Asia in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/asia/trump-asia.html [https://perma.
cc/8C2M-6EDS] (discussing the effects of the United States’ “hands off” approach in Asia).
79. See Wong, supra note 78. 
80. Id.
 81. John Schaus, The Limits of Good Strategy: The United States in the Asia Pacific 

































Trump stated that the United States and China are “strategic partners” and
notably, the administration held back from taking actions that may upset 
Beijing, like failing to send strong signals about the United States’ position
on the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests.83 These approaches taken 
by the United States form a pattern that leaves world leaders, and many 
leaders in Asia, lacking confidence that the United States under the current 
administration has the willingness or ability to lead in global affairs and 
perpetuate stability in Asia.84 
Without properly addressing the potential loss of control in the region, 
the United States faces the potential of losing significant trade partners
and ultimately its dominant position as the leading economic power in the
Pacific. Decisions like the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP signal
to other countries the end of free trade led by the United States in the South 
China Sea.85 China can now regulate how regional trade is conducted,
which will have a ripple effect on China’s financial and political ties with 
other countries.86 If the United States fails to regain influence, China will 
continue to fill the vacuum and use its massive economic and political 
87 power to control trade in the region.
B. Strategic Value of the South China Sea
The United States has a wide range of differing security commitments
in East Asia and has formal defense and security alliances with Japan, 
South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia.88 In addition to formal
commitments in the region, the United States also has a variety of formal 
security cooperation agreements with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.89 The
United States also enjoys a large endowment of military equipment, including 
a massive stockpile of ships, aircrafts, and bases, and has extensive military 
experience.90 In sum, the United States established and maintained a complex
and dense network of security partnerships and obligations throughout Asia, 
which are sustained by the regular presence and contact of its military 
presence.91 
83. Wong, supra note 78. 
84. Schaus, supra note 81. 
85.  Peter Pham, Why Did Donald Trump Kill This Big Free Trade Deal?, FORBES




88. See Ott, supra note 46. 
89. Id.
 90. See Paal, supra note 8.
 91. See Ott, supra note 46. 
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Through this existing network of allies and friendly countries, the 
United States currently retains a huge advantage over China in the Asia 
Pacific—for the time being.92 However, the United States should not take 
this network for granted as China is rapidly increasing the size of its military 
and modernizing its military assets,93 while the United States’ military 
assets become outdated and its military presence in the region dwindles.94 
China’s modernization and military growth create a growing challenge for 
U.S. policymakers by drawing significant issues that Congress must address 
about the United States’ goals and strategy in the Asia Pacific.95 
If the United States continues to improperly address China’s rise and 
growth in Asia the strategic consequences may devastate regional stability.96 
Southeast Asia faces the likely possibility of being subordinate to the 
97overarching strength and will of China.  South Korea and Japan will also 
face a new reality with China in complete control of their trade routes by 
sea, and the credibility of U.S. security support for allies and partners will 
be completely decimated by the spread of Chinese control and influence 
in the region.98 
V. RECENT EVENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. Applicable International Law
Several countries now lay claim to some part of the South China Sea,99 
with most countries laying claim based on the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which states that a country’s territorial 
waters extend 200 miles off of their shore, an area referred to as their 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).100 In their EEZ, the coastal state possesses
92. See Paal, supra note 8.
 93. Id.
 94. See David Lague & Benjamin Kang Lim, New Missile Gap Leaves U.S. Scrambling 
to Counter China, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/ 
special-report/china-army-rockets/ [https://perma.cc/N5J3-2EJ7].
95. DOLVEN ET AL., supra note 65. 
96. See Ott, supra note 46. 
97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. See South China Sea Dispute: China’s Pursuit of Resources ‘Unlawful’, Says 
US, BBC (July 14, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53397673 [https://perma.cc/ 
4NZ4-D5F7].
100. O’ROURKE, supra note 30. 
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sovereign rights to the natural resources of the zone.101 Any area that falls 
outside of a country’s EEZ is regarded as international waters.102 No nation 
or state can control the international waters, and each nation has unregulated 
liberty to take part in any water-related activities, such as fishing, constructing 
infrastructure, and research.103 
B. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea
Although UNCLOS is widely accepted as law,104 China is involved in
several maritime and EEZ disputes in the South China Sea, where China 
is asserting territorial claims well within the EEZs of its regional neighbors.105 
China is a party to maritime territorial disputes over the Paracel Islands, 
which are claimed by both Vietnam and China.106 Additionally, China, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim the Spratley Islands while the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei also claim to own parts of the Spratleys.107 There
are additional quarrels over ownership of the Scarborough Shoal, which 
is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines.108 China asserts that 
it has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters 
based on historical claims to these areas.109 




 What Does The Term “International Waters” Mean?, WORLD 
(May 10, 2018), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-does-the-term-international-
waters-mean.html [https://perma.cc/6MTG-2WS8].
103. Id.
104. As of this writing, UNCLOS has been ratified by a total of 162 countries and the
European Union. See Aditya Singh Verma, A Case for the United States’ Ratification of 
UNCLOS, THE DIPLOMATIST (May 2, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://diplomatist.com/2020/
05/02/a-case-for-the-united-states-ratification-of-unclos/ [https://perma.cc/ES6B-3EZS].
 (June 21, 2016), https://thediplomat. 
105. See Ott, supra note 46. 
106.  O’ROURKE, supra note 30, at 6. 
107.  Id. at 7. 
108. Id.
 109. DOLVEN ET AL., supra note 65; see also Bill Hayton, China’s ‘Historic Rights’ 
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ISLAND DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA110 
In late 2015, China completed a campaign of land reclamation in the 
South China Sea on the Spratly Islands, where China added over 3,200 
acres of land to seven of the landmasses in the Spratly Islands.111 China is 
now using these artificial islands for a variety of military bases and civilian 
outposts.112 Major construction features on some of the largest land masses 
included new airfields, large port facilities, and water and fuel storage.113 
As of late 2016, major construction in these areas also included twenty-
four fighter-sized hangars, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration 
buildings, and communication facilities.114 China claims it created these
outposts to improve living and working conditions for those stationed 
110. Why is the South China Sea Contentious?, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2016), https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349 [https://perma.cc/6HP4-WPDW]. 
111. O’ROURKE, supra note 30, at 55. 
112. See A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 14, 2017), 
[
https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/ 
https://perma.cc/5DYZ-Y5AT]; see also Luis Martinez, Why the US Navy Sails Past
Disputed Artificial Islands Claimed by China, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2019, 8:32 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-navy-sails-past-disputed-artificial-islands-claimed/
story?id=60993256 [https://perma.cc/JGN2-487X].
113. O’ROURKE, supra note 30, at 55. 
114. Id.
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there, increase the safety of navigation, and improve research capabilities.115 
However, many analysts contend that China is instead attempting to
bolster its control over the region by improving its military and civilian
infrastructure.116 
Although the land reclamation and artificial islands do not legally 
strengthen China’s territorial claims or create territorial sea entitlements, 
China is using these new features to bolster their claim in the South China 
Sea and improve China’s control of the area.117 By increasing their presence
in the region with these new features, China is able to significantly improve 
its ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third 
parties in the South China Sea, including military activities by the United 
States.118 
In addition to the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, “the
United States and China have a long-simmering disagreement over the 
right of foreign militaries to operate in the South China Sea.”119 The United
States contends that these areas are international waters and therefore, 
according to maritime law, they should be free to operate.120 In support of
its contentions, the United States continues to conduct freedom of navigation 
operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea to contest China’s increasing 
claims and military presence.121 China, however, insists that freedom of 
navigation in international waters should not cover military ships.122 The
United States’ decision to continue or decrease the frequency of these FONOPs 
will play a particularly important role in the regional stability of the South 
China Sea. 
C. Disputes in the South China Sea Moving Forward
Despite the loss of the United States’ influence and confidence in
the region, issues in the South China Sea have begun to cool down, thanks 
to efforts made by China and ASEAN countries.123 These efforts include
115. Id.
 116. Id.
 117. See id.
 118. Id.
 119. DOLVEN ET AL., supra note 65. 
120.  See Eleanor Freund, Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical 
Guide, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFF., HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (June 2017), https:// 
www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide
[https://perma.cc/RD95-22AG].
121. O’ROURKE, supra note 30, at 11–12. 
122. Id.
 123. Wu Shicun, What’s Next for the South China Sea?, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 1,
2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/whats-next-for-the-south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TUV9-6G8J].
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improved economic and cultural engagement as well as security and maritime 
management, all of which are efforts to improve relations and pose new 
opportunities for advancement in Asia.124 For example, in October 2018,
the first China-ASEAN Joint Naval Exercise was held in the South China 
Sea, marking a new phase of maritime security cooperation and regional 
stability.125 Additionally, the improved relationship between China and 
the Philippines laid a foundation for dispute resolution between the two 
countries in the South China Sea.126 
However, there are still a host of factors that may challenge these newfound 
improvements and advancements. Military activities and deployments 
made by the United States have steadily increased in response to the growing 
Chinese naval presence in the region.127 The Trump Administration continues
to increase FONOPs in the South China Sea, along with bilateral or multilateral 
joint military exercises, coast guard patrols, and other forms of collaboration 
with its allies and partners.128 The United States is actively taking these 
measures to “maintain its overwhelming military advantage against China.”129 
In sum, the United States must carefully balance its objectives to secure
regional stability in the area with its desire to maintain a dominant military 
presence in the territory. China threatens to undermine the United States’ 
influence and control as it successfully builds mutually beneficial relationships 
with formerly contentious neighbors.130 As a result, China has obtained 
notable success in consolidating its position in the South China Sea while 
also undermining American credibility.131 Moving forward, the strategic
and military competition between China and the United States will continue 




 127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id.
130. Many of these non-military advantages from China are often overlooked even 
though they are creating significant deterrence from affected countries to put up strong 
resistance. See LYNN KUOK, BROOKINGS INST., HOW CHINA’S ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2019). 
131. Id.
 132. See Shicun, supra note 123. 
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VI. COUNTRIES FACING PRESSURE BY CHINA
China’s development of islands in the South China Sea and its 
economic strategies are playing out in dangerously close proximity to 
important regional partners of the United States.133 If these actions by 
China are left unchecked, there is a significant risk of “jeopardizing decades 
of security and prosperity in Asia.”134 China’s goal is not necessarily to 
physically force out the United States’ presence in these countries or 
prevent rotational deployments or joint-exercises in the Asia-Pacific, but 
rather to eliminate or limit the United States’ influence over countries in 
the region.135 In both China and the United States, there is a belief that if 
China establishes regional military superiority over the United States, it will 
be able to force the United States out of the Asia-Pacific.136 Fortunately for
the United States, it will be far more difficult for China to transform its 
military presence into political influence.137 
Economically, China is pursuing several approaches towards gaining 
economic influence with its regional neighbors to get around the United 
States’ presence and control. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of 
China’s approaches towards achieving this goal.138 The BRI project is
estimated to affect 65% “of the world’s population, one-third of the world’s 
GPD . . . and three-quarters of the world’s energy sources.”139 Scholars
state that the purpose of the BRI is to power continuing economic growth 
and lay the foundation for further economic stability.140 The BRI aims to 
achieve this goal through sustained and increased access to energy since 
the BRI will “promote cooperation in the connectivity of energy 
infrastructure . . . and [will increase cooperation] in regional power grid
upgrading and transformation.”141 
Although these goals seemingly appear to be quite beneficial for all parties
involved, there are several factors that must be considered regarding the
133. See id.
 134. Carter, supra note 6.
 135. Andrei Lungu, China is Blowing its Chance in the Asia-Pacific, FOREIGN POL’Y




138. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is designed to “connect Asia with Africa and
Europe via land and maritime networks . . . with the aim of improving regional integration, 
increasing trade, and stimulating economic growth.” Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), EUR. 
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/ 
overview.html [https://perma.cc/JW3C-M7K9]. 
139. Wendy Simon-Pearson, One Belt, One Road, One Treaty: China’s Energy Security




MARINELLI2-PIC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 2:56 PM    
  






















   
  
[VOL. 22:  115, 2020] China and the South China Sea
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
BRI’s shift of regional power and influence. For example, one of the 
major prospects of the BRI is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), which “addresses China’s unease with American naval control 
of the South China Sea.”142 A major factor of the CPEC is its ability 
to transfer energy and goods from China’s western provinces to the Indian 
Ocean, where they are not subject to the United States’ naval patrols.143 
This factor is important in the overall rebalancing of power between 
China, the United States, and other countries in the region. The foundation 
laid by the BRI will be an “important part of Chinese trade and investment 
initiatives [with its neighbors] that [will] advance economic integration 
and promote greater economic reliance on China.”144 Additionally, the
BRI sends a message to the world that China is no longer biding its time 
and maintaining a low profile.145 Instead, China is now explicitly stating 
a foreign policy that reflects China as Asia’s dominant power.146 
In addition to its approaches towards improving infrastructure in the
region, China is also applying different sources of pressure and influence
on its neighbors that are important to consider. For example, the countries 
discussed below currently experience economic pressure or military
aggression by China. 
A. The Philippines
In the Philippines, a longstanding military partner to the United States,
Filipino President Duterte forged closer ties with China since rising to
power in 2016, and in turn, China invested billions into the Philippines.147 
However, disputes in the South China Sea between the Philippines and 
China are testing these ties.148 In 1995, the Philippines discovered that
China had unilaterally constructed structures on Mischief Reef in the 
142. Id. at 112. 
143. See id.
144. Joshua P. Meltzer, China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the




147. See As China Invests Billions in the Philippines, Tensions Flare Over South 
























South China Sea.149 Over time, “China began to occupy other uninhabited
reefs and low-tide elevations that were internationally adjudicated to [the 
Philippines by UNCLOS].”150 Even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration
delivered a decision in 2016 that invalidated Chinese claims to the landmasses 
in the South China Sea, China ignored the result and continued its occupation 
and construction of military structures in the area.151 
Since President Duterte came into power, China has accelerated its 
creation and militarization of islands in the South China Sea.152 In addition 
to its occupation and activities on these islands, the Chinese militia in the 
South China Sea bullies and pressures Filipino fishing vessels; in one 
instance sinking a ship, abandoning the scene, and leaving its twenty-two 
occupants afloat in the ocean.153 President Duterte downplayed the incident, 
describing the sinking of the ship as a “little maritime accident.”154 However,
this is not the only incident where the Philippines ceded ground and acquiesced 
to China. For example, President Duterte explained the presence of Chinese 
fishing vessels in the Philippines’ EEZ by claiming that he had a verbal 
agreement with Beijing in 2016 that gave China the right to fish in these 
waters.155 By ceding these waters to China, President Duterte further 
bolstered China’s claims to the region to the detriment of the Philippines 
and its own claims to the waterways.156 
These recent events between the Philippines and China ought to place
the United States on notice of China’s steadily increasing influence both 
in the region and on historically steadfast American allies in the South 
China Sea. President Duterte’s acquiescence to Chinese pressure is compelled 
by the Philippines’ precarious geographical and political position. 
149. Paal, supra note 8. 
150. Id.
 151. Id.; see also The Republic of Phil. v. The People’s Republic of China, Case No. 
2013-19, Certified Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/ 
2086. 
152. See As China Invests Billions in the Philippines, Tensions Flare Over South China
Sea, supra note 147. 
153. Raissa Robles, Chinese Vessel Mainly to Blame for Sinking of Philippine Boat 
in South China Sea, but Filipino Crew had ‘Deficiencies’: Leaked Report, THIS WEEK IN 
ASIA (July 8, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3017757/ 
chinese-vessel-mainly-blame-sinking-philippine-boat-south [https://perma.cc/J3FU-BKQ7]. 
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B. Malaysia
Like the Philippines, Malaysia also seeks to “minimize tensions [with 
China] in the South China Sea.”157 Malaysia has expressed statements 
indicative of acquiescence to Chinese pressure.158 For example, Malaysian
Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah “denied seeing an increase in Chinese 
nave vessels, despite reports of increased sightings of Chinese naval, coast 
guard, and maritime militia vessels [in Malaysian waters] in the South 
China Sea.”159 Furthermore, in September 2019, Malaysia and China
“announced a bilateral consultation mechanism on maritime affairs,” which 
is likely to lead to positive development between the countries.160 
C. Japan
Strategic allies like Japan rely on the United States as a security guarantor, 
but the United States must not underestimate how economically dependent 
these countries are on China, “particularly as an export market and a [major 
factor] in manufacturing supply chains.”161 Japan and China currently contest 
sovereignty over a small island group between the mainland and Japan 
called the Senkaku Islands.162 The United States and Japan consider these
islands to be under Japanese Sovereignty, but China nonetheless routinely 
patrols these waters around the uninhabited islands in an attempt to 
“undermine claims that Japan effectively controls them.”163 
In response to China’s increased naval presence, Japan pursued both 
diplomatic and military responses.164 Since 2010, Japan has openly criticized 
Chinese actions over disputes in the South China Sea and “called for a 
negotiated solution [with China], which would include Vietnam and the 
157. Id.
 158. See id.
 159. Id.
 160. Id.
161. John S. Van Oudenaren, America’s Asian Allies Aren’t Ready for a Cold War
with China, THE NAT’L INT. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-
asian-allies-arent-ready-cold-war-china-35332 [https://perma.cc/TN25-RVAU]. For an 
overview of trade figures between Japan and China see Japan exports from China, TRADING
ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/exports/china [https://perma.cc/2VS4-2XX3].
162. Paal, supra note 8. 
163. Id.
 164. Yoichiro Sato, Japan Versus China in the South China Sea, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. 
(Oct. 3, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan-versus-China-in-the-South- 
China-Sea [https://perma.cc/Z288-LEW2].
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Philippines.”165 Japan also provided naval support to Vietnam and the 
Philippines, including patrol boats, despite China’s repeated protests.166  
D. Vietnam
As China steps up its efforts to interfere with legitimate and lawful 
maritime economic activities of countries neighboring the South China 
Sea, it is also using its capable military presence in the contested sea to 
pressure foreign companies doing business with these countries.167 China
recently increased the pressure on smaller claimants to the South China 
Sea, particularly on Vietnam.168 This increase is due to several factors including 
a recently proposed development deal between China and the Philippines 
that is gaining traction.169 Since the Philippines and Vietnam are two of 
the strongest claimants opposing China’s excessive claims in the South 
China Sea, the progress made with the Philippines has allowed China to 
focus more on Vietnam.170 
Furthermore, China is also interrupting projects of companies based in 
the United States like Texas-based ExxonMobil, which recently found 
itself involved in a $10 billion natural gas project in Vietnam-claimed 
waters.171 The project, also known as Blue Whale, was due to come online 
in 2022 right as Vietnam is expected to experience an energy shortage.172 
The energy provided by this project is estimated to be able to power Hanoi 
for twenty years, generate $20 billion in revenue for the Vietnamese 
government, and create thousands of local jobs.173 Even though the project
is outside of China’s nine-dash line claims, there are still rumors that China 
is placing significant pressure on ExxonMobil to cease its involvement in 
the Blue Whale project.174 This could be China’s attempt to covertly
widen trade conflicts with the United States. If this is true, Vietnam will 
have few resources to rely on with a power shortage looming in the near 
165. Id.
 166. Id.
167. Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, Drivers and Risks of China’s Pressure on Vietnam, ASIA 









173.  Pitlo III, supra note 167. 
174. Daiss, supra note 171; Pitlo III, supra note 167. 
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future. Vietnam will need to turn to alternative sources like solar, wind, 
and “possibly even Chinese coal imports” to make up for the shortage.175 
VII. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Overview of ARIA
On December 31, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the 
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which “establishes a multifaceted 
strategy to increase U.S. security, economic interests, and values in the 
Indo-Pacific region.”176 A primary motivator behind passing ARIA is the
challenge perceived in the United States Congress of dealing with China’s 
rise to power.177 In addition to addressing the United States’ conflicts with 
China, ARIA takes a broad swipe at several issues to be addressed throughout 
Asia, including a focus on human rights issues, terrorism, and nuclear 
disarmament in the Korean peninsula.178 As a whole however, the Act
seeks to “reassure U.S. allies, strategic partners, and other nations of the 
United States’ continued commitment to the region.”179 But in application,
the Act is just support for “a more engaged [United States] in Asia and a 
statement of concern about China’s rise [to power].”180 
Through ARIA, the United States Congress is “exercising oversight 
over the Executive through authorizing expenditure for specific activities” 
in Asia.181 For example, Congress requires annual reports on security issues 
and mandates specific strategies to achieve the above-listed objectives.182 
Through their congressional oversight, the writers of ARIA prioritized the 
“relations with treaty allies and strategic partners across the Indo-Pacific 
175. Daiss, supra note 171. 
176. Ankit Panda, What ARIA Will and Won’t Do for the US in Asia, THE DIPLOMAT




179. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
180.  Ankit Panda, Is Donald Trump’s ARIA an Overture to Greater Harmony in the 
Indo-Pacific region?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.scmp. 
com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2181807/donald-trumps-aria-overture-greater-harmony- 
indo-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/QYS8-DYX9].
181. Carl Thayer, ARIA: Congress Makes Its Mark on US Asia Policy, THE DIPLOMAT 























   
  




region,” including an emphasized address to the “challenges posed by 
China’s destabilizing activities [in the region] . . . including the East China
Sea and the South China Sea.”183 
The writers of the Act acknowledged that the United States must 
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific, or the international 
system may wither.184 The writers were aware of China’s destabilizing 
activities that disrupted military security.185 Therefore, to counteract these 
activities, the writers of ARIA declared that the United States intends to 
“continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific by—(A) defending peace 
and security, (B) advancing economic prosperity, and (C) promoting respect 
for fundamental human rights.”186 
For this Comment, ARIA is best understood by identifying four main
sections outlining American intentions to promote and develop (1) policy 
and diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific, (2) promotion of American
security interests in the Indo-Pacific, (3) promotion of economic interests 
in the region, and (4) promotion of American values in the Indo-Pacific.187 
Each of these sections include a statement of applicable United States
policy and requires the executive branch to report to Congress on various 
aspects of its implementation.188 
However, ARIA fails to address the strong economic interdependence 
between the United States’ trading partners and national security interests 
in Asia.189 ARIA is not written to take affirmative steps towards managing 
China’s rise and is indicative of American policy that is drastically 
underprepared and unaware of China’s potential to supplant the United 
States in Southeast Asia. The policy outlined in ARIA is too aspirational 
and detached from the current situation to handle the issue. ARIA’s main 
impact will likely be symbolic by signaling American commitment to the 
region and defining efforts by Congress to support that end, but as it is 
written, it is only aspirational.190 
B. Security Provisions
ARIA states that the Indo-Pacific region poses significant security
challenges that threaten to undermine the United States’ national security
183. Id. 
184. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
185.  See id. 
186. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-409, § 2(5), 132 Stat. 
5387, 5388 (2018). 
187. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
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interests, influence, and global stability.191 In addressing those challenges,
ARIA sets aside $1.5 billion for the Department of State, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, and the Department of Defense.192 This
money is meant to “advance United States foreign policy interests and 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific;” “improve the defense capacity and resiliency 
of partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security 
threats;” and “conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, 
particularly with the United States’ most highly capable allies and partners 
to meet strategic challenges,” including the challenges presented by 
certain destabilizing activities by China.193 The amounts appropriated are
later earmarked specifically for “United States Government efforts to 
counter the strategic influence of” China and their efforts to undermine 
the international system.194 
To combat recent Chinese territorial aggression, ARIA also states that 
it is the commitment of the United States to promote “freedom of navigation 
under international law.”195 This commitment is in direct contrast to recent 
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, where China aggressively defends 
its perceived maritime territories in direct contradiction with international 
law as described in greater detail above.196 Through its freedom of navigation
operations (FONOPs), the United States generally contests these excessive 
maritime claims through diplomatic communications, operational assertions, 
and bilateral and multilateral consultations.197 ARIA seeks to emphasize
the United States’ commitment to pursue these measures in order to reinforce 
internationally-recognized territorial claims.198 The writers of ARIA seek 
to do so by continuing FONOPs in the contested areas.199 
ARIA also calls for the president to develop diplomatic strategies to work 
with the United States’ allies and partners to conduct FONOPs in the Indo-
Pacific, including in the South China Sea “in support of a rules-based 
international system benefitting all countries.”200 This statement is essentially
191. Id.




195. Id. § 102. 
196.  Freund, supra note 120. 
197.  Id. 
198. See Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, § 102. 
199.  See id. 
 200. Id. § 213. 
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a thinly-veiled call to action for the president to reestablish maritime 
superiority to contest Chinese influence and growing dominance. 
In its diplomatic strategy, ARIA also emphasizes the United States’ 
commitment “to expand appropriate security and defense cooperation with 
allies and partners, as appropriate.”201 As part of the $1.5 billion set aside, 
ARIA states that the appropriation should be used, among other things, 
“to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of partner nations . . . through 
foreign military financing and international military education and training 
programs.”202 In addition to improving defense capacities through financial
support, the Act also seeks to conduct bilateral and multilateral engagements 
with allies and partners to meet strategic challenges, including those challenges 
presented by China’s destabilizing activities.203 
C. Economic Provisions
ARIA also includes provisions expressing congressional support for 
bilateral, multilateral, or regional trade agreements that will lead to the 
protection and creation of American jobs and promote the growth of the 
United States economy.204 It encourages a “comprehensive economic
engagement” framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), continued use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
and other agreements.205 ARIA also focuses on intellectual property protection 
issues, which are a serious point of contention in the developing trade war 
with China.206 The Act states that the president should take substantial
steps to protect the United States’ intellectual property and treat the issue 
as a top priority, particularly against intellectual property violations by 
China.207 
In its emphasis on the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership, ARIA seeks 
to help “build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, 
and socially responsible community of nations” and urges ASEAN to continue 
to foster greater integration among its members.208 In this section, ARIA
draws parallel language to its diplomatic provisions that reinforce international 
determinations of maritime territories. ARIA states that, through efforts 
201. Id. § 102. 
202. Id. § 201. 
203. Id. 
204. See § 301 (titled “Promoting United States Economic Interests in the Indo-Pacific
Region”). 
205. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
 206. See Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, § 305. 
207. Phase One of the trade agreement mentioned above is another example of the 
United States’ determination to protect intellectual property. Id. 
 208. Id. § 205. 
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by the United States and ASEAN allies, the United States will support the 
enhancement of maritime capability and maritime domain awareness.209 
The writers intended to support this statement by enhancing the maritime 
capabilities of countries that respond to emerging threats to maritime 
security in the region.210 
VIII. WHAT ARIA IS FAILING TO DO
A. ARIA Fails to Address Significant Economic Issues
China has integrated itself with the rest of the world and is currently the 
“world’s second-largest economy, [a] top trading nation, and [the] most 
populous country.”211 The United States must address the immense 
influence and potential that the Chinese economy has over the United 
States. China is one of the world’s leading exporters of technology, with 
much of its technology being designed by companies based in the United 
States who in turn receive tremendous profit.212 The two countries are
increasingly interdependent and failure to uphold this link between their 
economies is not a realistic option.213 
However, the recent trade war with China indicates a United States 
policy that is unaware of or disregards the importance of maintaining this 
relationship. President Trump recently tweeted that “[o]ur great American 
companies are hereby ordered to immediately start looking for an alternative 
to China, including bringing our companies HOME and making your 
products in the USA.”214 Since President Trump came into office, U.S. trade
policy has undergone drastic reorientation, creating volatility and significantly 
impacting global trade and supply chains.215 Statements like these paired
with the unreliability of the United States’ commitment to international 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Paal, supra note 8, at 5. 
212.  Id. at 5–6. 
 213. Id. at 6.
214.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2019, 7:59 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164914960046133249 [https://perma.cc/
C5P9-ZFTD].
215. Brian Harding & Kim Mai Tran, U.S.-Southeast Asia Trade Relations in an 
























trade agreements due to presidential turnover have created unease with 
the United States’ Asian allies and trading partners.216 
For instance, on his third day in office, President Trump pulled out of 
the Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pursued an interest in 
only forming bilateral trade deals that have had widespread implications 
for U.S.-Southeast Asia economic and political relations.217 The TPP was 
designed to open more Asian markets to the United States’ goods, provide 
much needed protection for United States-based companies’ intellectual 
property, and reinforce environmental and labor productions.218 Each of 
these benefits would have mutually benefitted United States-based companies 
operating in the region and the people of those areas.219 By rejecting the
TPP, the United States is driving its Asian allies and partners into the arms 
of China’s state-run economy and giving China even greater leverage to 
impose its will upon its regional neighbors.220 
Although Congress intended ARIA to reassure our allies in Asia about 
the United States’ pivot towards Asian trade relations, ARIA does not take 
an assertive stance towards preserving or extending this economic relationship. 
The United States’ allies and trading partners, who have long benefited
from the presence of the United States in their region, are now uncertain
as to how the United States will decide its future role in the Asia-Pacific.221 
These countries are also paying close attention to China.222 They can sense
China’s growing strength and influence and now face the dilemma of 
sticking by an unreliable United States partnership or acquiescing to their 
powerful neighbor. 
B. ARIA Insufficiently Addresses Military and Strategic Issues
The writers of ARIA correctly found that the Indo-Pacific region poses 
significant security challenges that threaten American national security 
interests, regional peace, and global stability through viable threats from 
China and North Korea.223 The Act emphasizes that Congress is aware of
the importance of working with allies and partners to confront common 
challenges and calls for a policy that secures national security interests of 
216. Id. at 2.
 217. Id. 
218. Carter, supra note 6.
219.  Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Paal, supra note 8. 
222.  Id. 
223. See Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-409, § 2, 132 Stat. 
5387. 
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the United States along with its partners and allies.224 ARIA addresses the
need for strategic policy and lays a more firm stance than its address of 
economic policy goals. In contrast to its economic policies, ARIA asserts 
clear goals and policy requirements in pursuance of current strategic strategies. 
These policies include the commitment to freedom of navigation operations 
patrols (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, where the United States actively 
patrols international waters to deter Chinese territorial claims.225 ARIA lays
out a plan to continue business as usual in the South China Sea with 
a maintained emphasis on addressing threats from China and North Korea.226 
However, Professor Graham Allison argues that the likelihood of military 
conflict between two great powers, such as the United States and China, 
is significantly more likely if the United States continues to pursue 
business as usual.227 Both President Xi Jinping of China and President
Obama addressed the issue of the Thucydides Trap and recognized it as a 
unique challenge faced by their countries, but it is unclear how President 
Trump will address the issue.228 Regardless of President Trump’s uncertainty, 
it is undisputed that war with China would be catastrophic and is deeply 
undesired by both the United States and China.229 
ARIA recommends that the United States continue to pursue policies 
like FONOPs, expanding security and defense cooperation with allies, and 
sustaining a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific.230 Unfortunately,
these recommendations fail to address pertinent issues. Although the appeal 
towards reaffirming relationships with allies such as Japan, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Thailand, and India is a step in the right direction, ARIA fails 
to address the need to fundamentally pivot from the United States’ current 
strategies and pursue a new course of action. 
224. Id.; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
 225. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
 226. Id.
227. Professor Allison argues that if the United States pursues business as usual with 
China, then it should expect history as usual, which in the framework of the Thucydides 
Trap, is likely to be war. See Talks at Google, Destined for War: America & China 
| Graham Allison | Talks at Google, YOUTUBE (July 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hDZAVNPbtBg [https://perma.cc/LVQ2-JCGL].
228. Farah Mohammed, Can the U.S. and China Avoid the Thucydides Trap?, JSTOR 
DAILY (Nov. 5, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/can-the-u-s-and-china-avoid-the-thucydides-
trap/ [https://perma.cc/CGS5-LUH2]. 
229. See Chen Xiangmiao, The US ‘New Cold War’ Battle Cry in the South China 
Sea, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 17, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/the-us-new-cold-
war-battle-cry-in-the-south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/6Q92-YFK6].
230. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
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IX. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. How ARIA Should Address Economic Issues
The United States needs to present itself as a dependable and longstanding 
economically in Asia. ARIA, in its current form, fails to pursue a more
affirmative stance to reassure Asian countries of the United States’ intent
to remain a viable partner. The language presented in ARIA is too 
aspirational and lacks the necessary impetus for the proposed policies to
survive long enough to make a significant impact on the United States’
trade partners in Southeast Asia. Essentially, the United States needs to 
promote economic policies in Southeast Asia that instill confidence in its 
trade partners. However, the volatility of economic policies caused by
presidential administration turnover fails to promote this confidence. 
The United States views ARIA as a chance to reach a new trade deal 
with Asian countries after President Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).231 However, the United States ought to pursue 
a substantial shift away from realigning its existing trade deals with each 
presidential administration turnover. The United States Congress ought to 
pursue legislation that is more likely to bind future presidential administrations. 
Without legislation to provide relative certainty to Asian trading partners 
and strategic allies of the United States’ commitment in the region, China 
will continue to grow as a viable alternative for Asian countries seeking 
certainty and confidence in their economic partners and military allies. 
B. How ARIA Should Address Military and Strategic Issues
Rather than reinforcing current policies like those outlined in the
economic goals of ARIA, the strategic issues addressed in ARIA would
be better suited if they were to take a completely different approach
towards the potential conflicts with China. ARIA ought to pursue a more 
active route in negotiations with China to get it to settle its maritime and 
sovereignty disputes in the South and East China Seas. Prompting China 
to resolve these disputes with its neighbors is imperative because a third-
party dispute would likely draw the United States into a military conflict
with China.232 
231. ARIA is believed to embody the United States’ attempt to consolidate power 
and the dependency of Asian countries on the United States to strengthen regional integration 
for American influence. See Zhorea Shara Garcia, The Asia Reassurance Initiative Ace 
and ASEAN, ASEAN BRIEFING (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/ 
2019/01/24/asia-reassurance-initiative-act-asean.html [https://perma.cc/84AU-ZGW3].
232. See Talks at Google, supra note 227. 
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Conflict with North Korea is an excellent example of a third-party that 
could drag the United States and China into military conflict. With a history 
of aggression and instigating conflicts with its neighbors, there is a likelihood 
that North Korea may start a war with neighboring Japan.233 This is exemplified
by the recent missile launches into the Sea of Japan less than 200 miles 
from the Japanese Coast.234 Although it is unclear exactly what route China 
would take if North Korea calls for its defense, it would most likely create 
considerable unease regardless of China’s decision. 
C. ARIA Moving Forward
ARIA is meant to reaffirm the United States’ goals in Asia and provide 
reassurance to its trade partners and strategic allies that the growing 
conflict with China is a top priority.235 ARIA intends to apply future
United States policy in Asia and sets aside funding for the United States’ 
commitments and goals in this region.236 However, the language of the
Act is mostly aspirational and does not lay the groundwork for a policy 
that instills confidence in these Asian countries. In a time of political 
uncertainty and spontaneity, the United States needs to pass a more substantive 
version of ARIA to instill confidence in these affected countries of the 
United States’ intentions and viability as a trade partner. The uncertainty 
created by the Trump Administration’s willingness to abandon long-time 
trade partners and forego trade agreements has significantly decreased the 
certainty of the United States as a viable trading partner and military ally. 
By passing a more substantive law that would hold the United States
more accountable for its actions in Asia, the United States can reinforce 
the confidence that these Asian countries used to have in the United States 
as an economic partner and strategic ally. As countries regain confidence 
in the United States as a partner and ally, they will be less likely to readily
233. Motoko Rich, North Korean Missile Delivers a Message: There’s Little Japan 
Can Do, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/world/asia/ 
japan-north-korea-missile.html [https://perma.cc/5HS8-5M4Q].
234. The launch of the missile came one day after North Korea agreed to resume 
talks with the United States to discuss the dismantling of its nuclear facilities. See Victoria 
Kim, North Korea Launches Missile into Waters Near Japan Days Before Nuclear Talks 
Set to Resume with U.S., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
world-nation/story/2019-10-01/north-korea-launches-missile-into-waters-near-japan-days- 
before-nuclear-talks-set-to-resume-with-u-s [https://perma.cc/6DML-7T7Q].
235. Garcia, supra note 231. 
236. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 4.
 147




















acquiesce to Chinese influence. The United States needs to expressly reinforce
this confidence through policy measures beyond the proposals in ARIA. 
Without reasserting itself in this way, the United States will continue to
create uncertainty among its trade partners in Southeast Asia while China 
will be there to replace the United States.
There is historical and legislative precedent supporting Congress’s ability 
to restrain the executive branch in making foreign policy decisions that 
are important to consider.237 Congress has implied constitutional authority 
and vested interests that support active oversight of the president’s ability 
to regulate international policy.238 Through these powers, Congress has
oversight of the development of foreign policy by the executive branch, 
which can be applied to policies that endanger the United States’ neutrality 
or are otherwise contrary to national interests.239 For example, the War 
Powers Resolution Act passed in 1973 was designed by Congress to limit 
the president’s ability to introduce the United States into hostilities or 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is indicated.240 Among 
other restrictions included in the Act, the law requires the president to notify 
Congress after deploying the armed forces and extends oversight by limiting 
how long units can be engaged without further congressional approval.241 
Acts like the War Powers Resolution are undoubtedly the exception in 
Congress’s ability to restrain the president in matters of foreign policy. 
Historically, Congress was forced to take a backseat in presidential foreign 
policymaking, yet there are other indirect means that Congress can use to 
assert influence.242 Arguably, Congress can directly influence foreign policy
making through anticipatory reactions, legislative adjustments to the decision- 
making process in the executive branch, and, as employed extensively in 
modern politics, political grandstanding.243 
Properly applied to ARIA and the consequences of an unstable United
States foreign policy commitments in Asia and the South China Sea,
congressional oversight of the executive branch could feasibly provide the 
certainty that is needed by the United States’ trade partners and strategic
allies. Certainly, a step in the right direction by Congress would be to take 
237. See James M. Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters, 
107 POL. SCI. Q. 607, 610 (1992) (In the 1980s, “legislators placed so many constraints on 
the executive branch that by the end of the Reagan presidency ‘U.S. policy toward Central 
America was effectively being set by Congress.’”). 
238. L. ELAINE HALCHIN & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 3 
(Congressional Research Service 2012). 
239. Id. at 4. 
240.  War Powers Act, H.R. 4858, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
241. Id. at § 4.
242. Lindsay, supra note 237, at 609. 
243. Id. 
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a closer look at ARIA and reassess exactly how powers of congressional
oversight can be applied. By doing so, Congress may be able to provide 
Asian allies with confidence that ongoing foreign policy will outlast the 
turnover of periodic presidential administrations. 
X. CONCLUSION
The United States needs to take greater precautions and pay closer 
attention to the threats presented by China’s rise, especially concerning 
China’s influence in the South China Sea. There is an overwhelming concern 
among scholars, media, and governments that, due to China’s immense 
economic influence in the region, “a disruption of South China Sea trade 
would precipitate a global economic crisis.”244 Additionally, as argued
above, China has steadily been making maneuvers to tacitly, and in some 
cases, forcefully stake its claims in the South China Sea. Overall, China 
has proven to be quite successful despite its advances being opposed by 
many of its regional neighbors and the dominant influence of the United 
States. 
To counteract the advances made by a rising China, the United States
needs to take a more affirmative stance towards foreign policy in Asia.
The relationships shared between the United States and its trade partners
and military allies in Asia are becoming frayed. Many of these countries
are torn between the United States, a beneficial and benevolent partner
prone to unreliability with each presidential turnover, and China, a steady
and politically predictable partner with oppressive tendencies. 
In several ways, many of the United States’ former trade partners and 
allies no longer view the United States as a predictable trade partner and the 
uncertainty stemming from U.S.-China trade relations further exacerbates 
these feelings.245 A reassessed ARIA will help establish trust beyond the
uncertainty created by the United States’ executive administrational turnover. 
The United States must create a long-lasting policy that locks the executive 
branch to a specific policy route so that Asian countries may continue to 
see both the United States and China as viable partners, rather than being 
forced to choose between one or the other. 
244. Trade Transits, supra note 72. 
245. Harding & Tran, supra note 215. 
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